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Peace Architecture
Abstract
In the sixties the green and the peace movements alerted the international community of the deterioration
of the environment and of the danger of nuclear conflicts. Since then, the green movement has been
transformed into political parties, departments, jobs, environmental impact assessments and several
international regimes. The first publication of the Club of Rome in 1972, Limits of Growth, had a catalyzing
effect for raising life and death questions that confront mankind and claiming that planetary planning was
the most important business on earth (Meadows 1972). The peace movement, on the other hand, evolved
differently. There were some peak moments such as the peace marches in the eighties, but the impacts
were weaker and less decisive. One explanation is that the peace movement had to cope with the strong
bureaucracies of foreign offices and of defense departments that claimed the expertise. Another
explanation is that a great deal of the peace movement does not define peace as a collective good. Being
removed from the embedded conflict gives a false sense of apartness making some conflicts seem
irrelevant to societies at peace. The possibility of cruise missiles hitting peaceful countries caused huge
peace marches; the snipers in Sarajevo did not. A third reason is that costs of violence continue to be
underestimated because of inadequate estimates of the price of failed conflict prevention (Reychler
1999a).
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PEACE BUILDING ARCHITECTURE
Luc Reychler
Peace Re-Search
In the sixties the green and the peace movements alerted the international
community of the deterioration of the environment and of the danger of nuclear
conflicts. Since then, the green movement has been transformed into political
parties, departments, jobs, environmental impact assessments and several
international regimes. The first publication of the Club of Rome in 1972, Limits of
Growth, had a catalyzing effect for raising life and death questions that confront
mankind and claiming that planetary planning was the most important business on
earth (Meadows 1972). The peace movement, on the other hand, evolved
differently. There were some peak moments such as the peace marches in the
eighties, but the impacts were weaker and less decisive. One explanation is that the
peace movement had to cope with the strong bureaucracies of foreign offices and of
defense departments that claimed the expertise. Another explanation is that a great
deal of the peace movement does not define peace as a collective good. Being
removed from the embedded conflict gives a false sense of apartness making some
conflicts seem irrelevant to societies at peace. The possibility of cruise missiles
hitting peaceful countries caused huge peace marches; the snipers in Sarajevo did
not. A third reason is that costs of violence continue to be underestimated because
of inadequate estimates of the price of failed conflict prevention (Reychler 1999a).
The last explanation concerns the state of peace research. Despite a great
deal of progress and creativity, the field remains hampered by three weaknesses
(Reychler 1992, pp. 89-96). First, there is a lack of field experience or close
cooperation between professionals in the field and peace researchers. A synergy
between the speculari and operari (‘thinkers’ and ‘doers’) would enhance the peace
building business considerably. Second, there is a one-dimensional quality of peace
building; the negative side effects of many well-intentioned projects have been
documented.1 Finally, there is a ‘toolbox approach’ to peace building. The result is
that too many conflicted countries end up with piles of peace building stones, and
no sustainable peace building.
Despite all this, peace research is quickly reducing the gap with the green
movement. The prevention of violent conflicts has become a major point on the
agendas of foreign offices not only in the U.S. and in Europe, but also of major
international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU) and the Organization of African
Unity (OAU).2 The driving forces were not of moral or legal nature, but cost-benefit
considerations. Once a conflict crosses the threshold of violence it becomes much
more difficult and costly to manage it. Political, social, cultural, ecological,
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psychological and spiritual costs join the already considerable costs of humanitarian
suffering or economic destruction (Reychler 1999b). The human costs of failed
conflict prevention or transitional aid are very high. The process of transition in
Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, for example, had huge
development costs, many of which are still unabated (UNDP 1999). Human costs
refer to the loss of lives, the high levels of disease, poverty, socio-economic
disparity, rising gender inequality, educational decline, unemployment and many
less tangible costs. It has become clear that proactive conflict prevention (that is,
efforts made before a conflict has escalated) is more cost effective than reactive
conflict prevention (that is, efforts made after a conflict has become violent to
contain and reduce the intensity, duration and the possibility of geographic spill
over) (Brown and Rosecrance 1999). There is a growing perception that there are
limits to the level of violence the world can permit. It has become clear that
sustainable development is impossible without sustainable peace building. This
paper tackles one of the challenges of the international community in this decade;
namely, making the world safe from conflicts or creating a more effective system to
prevent violence.

Peace Architecture
A major part of this challenge is the development of better peace
architecture through more cost effective ways to create sustainable peace building
processes. Strategists, designers and planners are also concerned with combining
means and time efficiently. I found, for example, nearly one hundred peace plans
drafted before the Second World War. There is a great deal of flexibility and
overlapping in the meaning of the terms strategy, design, planning and architecture.
The term strategy continues to be strongly associated with states or their alliances
which are designed to focus on security, enemies and threats through the use of
military force and command. The term peace plan is also quite restrictive. Most
peace plans are legal blueprints for the creation of world peace or are too abstract in
context. The term design has more appeal, but it is associated with the construction
of conflict management systems or with business (for example, practice oriented
towards the development of products, tools, components and processes) (Magolin
and Buchanan, 1998).3
I prefer to use the metaphor ‘peace architecture’ because (a) it draws
attention to the architectural principles/considerations that have to be addressed in
sustainable peace building processes; (b) it emphasizes the need to identify the
necessary pre-conditions or building blocks for different types of conflicts; (c) it
could shorten the learning curve by providing a methodology for comparative
analysis and evaluation of conflict transformation; and (d) it could contribute to
greater attention paid to the vital role of peace architects.

Architectural Considerations and Principles
The image of peace architecture suggests that peace building is not only a
science but also an art, where imagination and creativity are an essential part of the
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building process. This conveys the need for professional peace architects and
architectural teams, and it draws attention to the key principles of the architecture
process. Following are six principles that should guide the design of peace building
processes.
1. A clear and compelling definition of the peace to be built. This requires a
reconciling of the competing needs of the owners and the concerns of the
stakeholders who will have to share the same fate; imaging a more attractive future;
and an estimation of the costs.
2. A contextual and comprehensive assessment of the available peace
building capacity with appreciative inquiry and of what still needs to be done to
build a sustainable peace building process.
3. The development of a coherent peace plan. Coherence refers to the
achievement of good time management and of a synergy between peace building
efforts in diverse domains, at different system-levels and layers of the conflict.
Table 1: Coherence between Domains, Levels, Time-factors
and Layers of a Conflict
Levels/Actors
-international - global
- regional
- sub-regional
-national
- elite
- middle
- local
Time-factors
-timing of
entry/exit

Domains/Measures
-diplomatic
-political
-economic
-humanitarian
-education
-information
-military

-lead time: long,
middle, short
-synchronic or
sequential
- duration
Layers
-public layers
-public behavior/opinion
-deeper layers
-private opinion,
perceptions, wishes,
expectations, feelings,
emotions, historical
memory
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4. An effective implementation of the peace plan. This involves not only the
commitment of sufficient time and means to build the sustainable peace process, but
also coordination and effective leadership.
5. The involvement/inclusion of the people who commissioned the peace
building (the owners) and the stakeholders in the whole process.
6. An identification and dismantling of the ‘senti-mental walls’4 that inhibit
the peace building process.

Building Blocks of Violence and Peace
Another challenge of architectural analysis is the classification of different
types of violence, peace and the identification of their causal antecedents or
necessary preconditions. From a comparative study of the architecture of the
genocides in Bosnia, Rwanda and Burundi, seven building blocks of genocide were
distilled (Reychler 2000):
Table 2. Building Blocks of Genocide
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

A country in transition with high levels of political, economic and cultural
insecurity and frustration.
An authoritarian government that attributes the responsibility of the
problems to a particular group.
A small group of fanatical leaders and a pliable majority.
A systematic dehumanization of the victimized group(s).
A plan for ethnic cleansing.
A relatively powerless victimized group.
An international community that disapproves morally of the genocidal
behavior, but does not take effective measures to prevent or stop the
massacres.

Table 3: Building Blocks of Sustainable Peace Building
•
•
•
•

•
•

An effective system of communication, consultation and negotiation at
different levels.
Political and economic peace enhancing structures (consolidated democracy
and social free market system).
An objective and subjective security system.
An integrative moral political climate, characterized by the expectation of
an attractive future resulting from cooperation, a replacement of exclusive
nationalism with multiple loyalties, reconciliation and dismantlement of
senti-mental walls.
Political, economic and security cooperation at a multilateral level.
A critical mass of internal and external peace building leadership.
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Comparative Analysis and Evaluation of Peace Architectures
Another challenge of architectural research is the development of ways and
means to improve sustainable peace building processes. A comparative analysis and
evaluation of successful and less successful peace building efforts could shorten the
learning curve significantly. In such a comparative study, three phases could be
distinguished. In the first phase an analysis and evaluation is made of the conflict to
be transformed. This gives an indication of the problems to be solved and the degree
of difficulty to be expected. The second phase involves an assessment of the results
or the output of the peace building efforts, while the third phase focuses on the
process.
Phase 1: Analysis and Evaluation of the Conflict to Be Transformed
In this part a diagnosis would be made of the actors, the issues, the
opportunity structure, the strategic approaches of the parties involved and of the
conflict dynamics. This gives us an idea of the type of conflict one is confronted
with, and also allows us to estimate the costs and difficulty of the conflict
transformation efforts. The latter implies additional data gathering and analysis of
the peace building efforts, such as: the actors included or excluded in the peace
process (levels/internal-external); the prescriptive or indicative nature of the
process; the operational definition of peace; the issues addressed; the tools selected;
the levels on which the peace efforts were focused; the layers of the conflict
addressed; the time management; the commitment of time and means and the
coordination of efforts.
Phase 2: Evaluation of the Outcomes/Results of the Peace Building Efforts
Here we focus on two criteria of effectiveness: the nature of the outcome
and the durability. The nature of the outcome is assessed by checking how and to
what extent the above-mentioned criteria of sustainable peace are satisfied. The
durability is assessed by studying the installation and consolidation of the necessary
preconditions of sustainable peace.
Phase 3: Evaluation of the Peace Building Process
This is the most difficult part of the comparative study because it requires a
thorough understanding of what is needed to build an effective, efficient and
satisfactory peace building process. In the second phase, the effectiveness was
assessed by looking at the nature of the outcome and the durability. To assess the
efficiency one uses direct and indirect sets of measures. The first set of direct
measures assesses the tangible and intangible costs of the transition such as the
human, economic, social, psychological, cultural, ecological, political and spiritual
costs; the amount of time wasted and missed opportunities and the impact of the
transition on the nature of the relations between the conflicting parties.
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Table 4. Evaluation of Peace Building Architecture

Criteria

Measurement

Effectiveness

Nature of outcome: characteristics sustainable peace
Durability: installation and consolidation of building blocks
Direct measures: costs/time/relations
Indirect measures of factors that are assumed to enhance
efficiency, such as inclusiveness of the process, early
warning of threats and opportunities, effective negotiation
and mediation efforts, etc.
With the process
With the relationship
With the outcome

Efficiency

Satisfaction

The second set of indirect measures studies the series of factors that tend to
enhance or inhibit transition processes. The efficiency of the peace building process
influences several variables below.
The involvement of the people who view themselves as deeply affected by
the peace building process. The inclusion or exclusion of the owners and
stakeholders makes the difference between failure and success. The people who see
their interest as deeply affected should be at the heart of the decision making
process. Others who should be included, consulted or informed are: those who could
hinder the successful implementation; those whose advise or assistance is needed;
and those whose approval will be required to enable the project to proceed
(Kraybill, 1995).
Effective communication, consultation, negotiation and mediation process.
This implies an evocative rather than a prescriptive approach and an acquaintance
with effective negotiation and mediation methods that tend to enhance win-win
agreements with low transaction costs, good relations and durable outcomes.
A contextual and comprehensive analysis of the problems which are
responsible for the conflict.5 Special attention should be directed to the components
of sustainable peace that need to be absent, installed or consolidated.
An appreciative inquiry of the strengths and the peace potential in the
conflict ridden zone. In contrast to the problem-oriented approach — which focuses
on the past, the problems, and the weaknesses — an appreciative inquiry turns the
attention to the future and the strengths on which peace could be built.
A clear and compelling definition of peace. The conflict behavior of the
parties is strongly influenced by their respective expectations about the future.
Therefore, the projection of a clear and attractive future could catalyze the conflict
transition process significantly. Peace architects such as Jean Monnet, succeeded in
convincing the Europeans that cooperation would bring them not only security, but
also freedom and affluence. In other cases, the parties will have to negotiate a better
future by reconciling competing values.
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The battery of tools used in the conflict transformation process. (For
example, European Community). These tools should be related to the specific peace
building needs in the conflict zone.
The coherence of the peace building plan. Here we look at the synergy or
the interaction of actions such that the total effect is greater than the sum of the
individual effects. Attention is paid to the cross impact of the efforts in different
domains (political, diplomatic, military, humanitarian, economic, etc.); at different
levels (internal and external – elite/middle/local); on different layers (public
behavior, opinions, perceptions, feelings) and time-factors. The purpose is to
enhance the positive and synergetic impact of the peace building efforts and prevent
and/or reduce the negative effects (Reychler 1999c, 144-162). The installation of an
effective conflict impact assessment system (CIAS) would help considerably (Davis
1996; Gardner 1993).
The use of time. Time is one of the vital and nonrenewable resources that
continue to be wasted. Time is money, but it also makes the difference between life
and death. Many violent conflicts are examples of missed opportunities. More
research should be undertaken about the role of time and timing in conflict
transformation. On the agenda are issues such as: attitudes towards time (proactive
versus reactive); the relative importance paid to the past, present and future in the
design of a reconciliation process, (for example; the lead-time of projects); the
preference of short-, middle- and long-term programs; the duration of the
intervention; when to enter and exit; how to schedule the interventions
(consequentially or simultaneously).
Other questions should be considered, including: Can elections be
organized when there is no agreement about power-sharing? Is there something like
an economic threshold below which efforts for democratization are a waste of time?
How should political democratization and economic privatization be linked?
Intelligent early warning. An intelligent early warning system tries not only
to anticipate threats and the risk of violent escalation, but also pays attention to the
opportunities to intervene proactively; to the costs of different conflict
transformation policies and the impact of planned policies, and programs or projects
about the dynamics of the conflict. The development and installation of an effective
conflict impact assessment system would increase the chances of a conflict
prevention system considerably.
Effective implementation of a peace building plan. This implies not only the
commitment of sufficient time and means but also leadership and a good
coordination of the peace building activities of the parties involved.
Unlearning and dismantling of ‘senti-mental walls’. Peace building is not
only about construction, but also about deconstruction. To analyze and transform
conflicts, more attention needs to be paid to political-psychological variables. In
particular, efforts should be made to identify and dismantle ‘senti-mental walls’.
This term refers to concepts, theories, dogmas, attitudes, habits, emotions and
inclinations that inhibit democratic transition and constructive transformation of
conflicts. The existence of senti-mental walls increases the chances of
misperceiving the situation and of misevaluating the interests at stake; they lower
the motivation to act on an opportunity and hinder the development of the necessary
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skills and know-how to overcome conflicts. The hyphenation of sentiment and
mental to ‘senti-mental’ is done to make people aware of the emotional roots. In a
comparative study of genocide, it became clear that the behavior of all actors was
distorted: the victims by despair, pluralistic ignorance and political inefficacy; the
offenders by historical falsification, stereotyping, dehumanization, distrust and
indifference; the third parties by neutralism/passivity/non-intervention, cultural
arrogance, moral-legal approach and the preference to wait until the conflict is
‘ripe’; the analysts by one-dimensional analysis, the use of invalid theories, pseudoscientific doctrines/myths/taboos, elitist analysis, wrong assessment of future
developments, etc.
A critical mass of peace building leadership. Without a critical mass of
external and internal leadership, who motivates, guides and commits people to the
peace building process, the chances of successful peace building are very low.
Could a leader make a difference in bringing people together? Do unfortunate
countries lack leadership or is the level of conflict sometimes too powerful for any
leader to overcome (Lederach 1997)? The premise is that an essential ingredient of
sustainable peace building is a critical mass of leadership that can raise hope,
generate ways and means to reach the goals, and commit people to the peace
building process. The critical mass of leadership needed depends on the specific
conflict context. It could include internal and external leadership; some conflicts can
be transformed successfully with internal leadership, others necessitate external
leadership to support the process.
The internal leadership to be involved could be situated at different levels.
The top level comprises the key political and military leaders in the conflict
(Monnet 1976). These people are the highest representative leaders of the
government and opposition movements or present themselves as such. The middle
range leadership is not necessarily connected to or controlled by the authority or
structures of the formal or major opposition movements. They could be highly
respected individuals or persons who occupy formal positions of leadership in
sectors such as education, business, religion, agriculture, health or humanitarian
organizations. The grassroots leadership includes people who are involved in local
communities, members of indigenous non-governmental organizations carrying out
relief projects for local populations, health officials and refugee camp leaders.

Process
The overall aim is to create a win-win situation or a mutually benefiting
sense of interdependence between all the parties involved and to embed the peace
building into institutions that reinforce and sustain the process. Jean Monnet
stressed repeatedly the importance of helping the Europeans to see their common
interests (leur intérêt commun). He also pleaded for the creation of ‘supranational’
institutions (such as the European commission), which could facilitate the
cooperation process (Kraybill 1995). Sustainable peace is seen (a) as the result of a
reconciliation of competing values, interests and needs, such as freedom, justice,
affluence, security, truth, mercy and dignity, and (b) as flourishing best in a
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consolidated democratic environment. A great deal of effort is spent on the
development of a good process (Bennis and Nanus 1985, p. 224).
The process is inclusive. Monnet insisted on talking to all participants
(government, business, unions, etc.) to engage all the stakeholders in the peace
building process. The assumption is that parties to a conflict will work more
effectively at a resolution if they have personal stakes in the successful outcome of
the process (Global Excellence Management 1999).
There is the belief that nothing positive can be expected from a peace plan
build on unequal grounds rules. Monnet insisted on negotiating on the basis of
equality and did not accept the idea of primus inter pares.
In order to build confidence, the process is made transparent. All plans
Monnet proposed were clear and simple. He believed trust could be achieved by
presenting unambiguous plans that would substantiate the peace process through
mutually beneficial goals. When initially some negotiators were suspicious, little by
little, they saw that there was nothing to hide.
The problem solving approach is enriched with an appreciative inquiry
(Monnet 1976, p. 273). Appreciative inquiry is a far more complex process than the
simple positive thinking approach with which it is sometimes confused. It involves
challenging the status quo by envisioning a preferred future and identifying the
existing peace building potential. Both the identification of the strengths and the
articulation of a realistic and attractive future, a condition that is in some important
ways better than what now exist, can accelerate the conflict transformation
considerably.
Another characteristic of peace builders is their proactive mindset. Monet
was a mover, not a care-taker. He not only envisioned a European Union, but he
also tried to assess the impact of policy alternatives proactively.
Characteristic is the open-minded search for alternative means to build
peace in an efficient way. Peace builders are not orators who instinctively know the
solution. Peace builders make a distinction between interests and positions and
search actively for formulas that satisfy all conflicting parties. In some cases, this
could mean integrative solutions (such as the creation of a European Union, the new
South Africa or the unification of East and West Germany) or a disintegrative
solution, such as the relatively peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Empire or the
smooth divorce of the Slovak and Czech people. A great deal of time is taken out to
search for and develop alternative solutions.
Decisions are not made on the basis of pressures or emotions, but on their
merit. Essential is the use of fair and objective standards and procedures for
evaluating alternative policy options. To convey the costs and benefits of alternative
futures Monnet made ample use of balance sheets.
It is important to engage and network with the leaders of different domains
and at different levels in the process. Monnet did not perform as a prima donna, but
preferred to give the limelight to the politicians: “Since they take the risks, they
should have the laurels” (Europa Notities 1996, p. 400).6
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Conclusion
To research more systematically the characteristics of peace architects such
as Jean Monnet would significantly contribute to more effective peace building. It
would not only help to identify and strengthen the peace building potential, but also
to track and weaken the spoilers in the peace building process. It could also
eliminate some of the stereotypical images of peace builders, such as the image of
passive pacifists. They do not only construct, but also need to deconstruct. They cut
through dogmas, taboos, doctrines, etiquette, cynicism and others sentimental
obstacles on the way to progress. Monnet challenged the ideas of political prestige
and economic protectionism; he pleaded for supra-nationalism and questioned the
belief in ‘archenemies’ or the existence of a politically independent economic
sphere. He was a professional with a cause.
Endnotes
1. Since the publication of Mary Anderson’s, Do No Harm: Supporting Capacities
for Peace through Aid, many studies have highlighted the negative impact of unidimensional well-intentioned efforts (humanitarian and structural aid, peace
keeping, democratization, etc) on the peace building process. The work done by
Peter Uvin has been remarkable.
2. For the European Union, see for example Conflict Prevention Network (1999).
3. See also K. Slaikeu and R. H. Hasson (1998); C. A. Constantino and C. S.
Merchant (1996); and W. L. Ury, J. M. Breet and S. Goldberg (1988).
4. See page 31 for a description of ‘senti-mental walls’.
5. A useful typology of impact can be found in M. A. Max-Neef (1991). He
distinguishes destroying – impact, pseudo-impact, inhibiting impact, singular
impact, synergic impact and exogenous and endogenous impacts.
6. See also M. Kohnstamm (1981) and Jean Monnet (1976).
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